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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN K. CROWLEY, 
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
: Case No. 2006-0712 CA 
CHRIS BLACK, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Plaintiff/Appellant John Crowley, by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, 
submits the following Brief of Appellant: 
PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
There are no prior or related appeals. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The 
Supreme Court has transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(j). 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
A. ATTORNEY FEE CLAIM 
After trial in this matter, in its oral ruling, the trial Court denied plaintiffs request 
for an award of attorney fees. The trial Court provided little explanation in its oral ruling 
as to the factual or legal reason for the denial of an award of attorney fees. 
Plaintiffs attorney fees request was based upon the written lease between the 
parties (Exhibit "P-2" introduced at trial). The written lease, in pertinent part, provides: 
ATTORNEY'S FEES: In the event that the Owner shall prevail in any 
legal action brought by either party to enforce the terms hereof or relating to 
the demised premises, Owner shall be entitled to all costs incurred in 
connection with such action, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
Plaintiff was the prevailing party because a judgment for past due rent, lost rent 
and for damages to the rental property was awarded to plaintiff at trial. Plaintiff was 
required to bring this law suit because of defendant's refusal to pay the last month's rent, 
damage to the property beyond ordinary wear and tear, etc. At no time did defendant, 
Chris Black ever admit any wrongdoing, fault, liability or debt. This action and a trial 
were necessary to collect damages from defendant and to enforce the lease agreement. 
Plaintiff incurred attorney fees and out of pocket expenses in excess of seven 
thousand dollars ($7,000.00) in pursuit of this action. Among other items, plaintiff was 
required to hire a private detective to find defendant to serve him with the summons and 
complaint in this action. Based upon the written lease, plaintiff is entitled to and should 
have been awarded attorney fees incurred in the successful pursuit of this action. 
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B. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST CLAIM 
In this landlord and tenant dispute, Plaintiff was awarded special damages for 
unpaid rent, for lost rent, and for damage caused to plaintiffs rental property during 
defendant's occupancy. All those damages are in amounts certain. All damages were 
established by evidence or receipts showing payment made by plaintiff in 2001 and 2002. 
In light of the nature of the damages awarded in specific amounts, plaintiff is entitled to 
pre-judgment interest. 
A trial court's decision to grant prejudgment interest presents a question of law. 
Lvon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, P73, 5 P.3d 616 (quoting Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 
1387 (Utah 1995); Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 171,177 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The 
law in Utah on this issue is clear: 
Where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a 
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest 
should be allowed from that time . . . and not from the date of judgment. 
On the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated 
with mathematical accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, 
wrongful death, defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the 
amount of the damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the 
fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed. 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989) (quoting First Sec. Bank 
of Utah v. J.BJ. Feedvards. Inc.. 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982)); see also Bellon v. 
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089,1097 (Utah 1991). 
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With clear and specific factual information, plaintiffs special damages as 
presented at trial and as found by the Court were measured by "facts and figures" or 
"calculated with mathematical accuracy." See Canyon Country Store. 781 P.2d at 422. 
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to prejudgment 
interest. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES WHEN PLAINTIFF PREVAILED AT TRIAL AND WAS AWARDED THE 
BULK OF THE DAMAGES CLAIMED IN HIS COMPLAINT? 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON LOST RENT, EXPENSES PAID FOR REPAIRS TO 
THE RENTAL PREMISES, ETC. WHEN THOSE AMOUNTS WERE EASILY 
CALCULATED, FIXED AMOUNTS AND INCURRED ON A SPECIFIC DATE? 
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED 
The issues to be considered on appeal were raised at trial in this matter, and 
resolved in the Court's oral ruling. Transcript of Trial. R. 154. The issues were raised 
and considered in post-trial motions. R. 86-92; 128-129. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. ATTORNEY FEE CLAIM 
"Whether attorney's fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law [that] we 
review for correctness." Cache County v. Beus. 128 P.3d 63 (Ut. Ct. App. 2005) [quoting 
A.K. & R Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv. 47 P.3d 92 (Utah 2004)]. 
When attorney's fees are recoverable, "[t]he trial court has broad discretion in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and [a reviewing court] will consider the 
determination against and abuse of discretion standard." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 40 
P.3d 1119, 1120 (Utah 2002). 
"We do, however, insist that a trial court's decision concerning a motion for 
attorney's fees be supported by adequate findings." Utahns for Better Dental Health-
Davis Inc. v. Davis County Comm'n. 121 P.3d 39,41 (Ut. Ct. App. 2005). 
B. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST CLAIM 
"A trial court's decision to grant or deny pre-judgment interest presents a question 
of law which we review for correctness." Smith v. Fairfax Realty. Inc.. 82 P.3d 1064 
(Utah 2003) [quoting Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)]. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
John Crowley filed suit against Chris Black on May 17,2002 alleging breach of 
the written rental agreement by which Black had resided in a rental property belonging to 
5 
Crowley. The complaint sought a total of $5538.00 for lost rent, damages to the property, 
cost of cleaning, etc. R. 1-5. The complaint sought an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
the written rental agreement. R. 1-5. 
Black answered the complaint on June 13, 2002. R. 8-10. 
A bench trial was held on April 4, 2006, the Hon. Glenn Iwasaki, judge presiding. 
R. 80-81. 
The Court ruled in favor of Crowley awarding damages in a total of $4679.26 for 
lost rent, damages to the property, cost of cleaning, etc. The Court denied an award of 
attorney fees under to the written rental agreement. The Court also denied plaintiffs 
request for prejudgment interest. R. 130-136; 137-138. Copy attached as Exhibit. 
A motion for new trial was made with regard to plaintiffs request for prejudgment 
interest and the attorney fees claim. R. 86-89; 90-92. 
That motion for new trial was denied. R. 128-129. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment were entered on June 26, 
2006. R. 130-136; 137-138. 
An extension of time as granted in which plaintiff could file an appeal. R. 141-
142. 
An appeal was filed within the extended time. R. 143-144. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Chris Lee Black leased plaintiff John Crowley's residential property 
at 8828 South Alpen Way, Sandy, Utah in July 1996 and was a tenant until approximately 
December 2001. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 46:25-47 and 60:8-13 (April 4, 2006). 
2. A lease agreement (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, "P-l") executed by defendant Black 
and the Crowleys' property management agency is dated July 3, 1996 and shows that a 
security deposit of $925.00 was paid by defendant Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 56:18-57:6 
(April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
3. The original lease agreement ("P-l"), signed by defendant Black, contains an 
inventory section which indicates that on July 3, 1996, the carpet, paint and blinds in the 
Alpen Way residence were all new and undamaged. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 61:22-62:11 
(April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
4. Defendant Black made a walk-through inspection of the Alpen Way property in 
July, 1996, when he first rented it. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 64:3-5 (April 4, 2006). 
5. During or after his July, 1996 inspection, defendant Black did not identify, note 
nor describe any existing damages in the place designated on the lease agreement which 
he signed on July 3, 1996. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 64:6-18 (April 4, 2006). 
6. Ms. Nancy Ann Crowley, co-owner of the Alpen Way property with her 
husband, plaintiff John Crowley, made a walk-through inspection of the entire house and 
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property shortly after defendant Black commenced his tenancy, on or about July 14, 1996. 
R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 47:7-18 (April 4,2006). 
7. Ms. Crowley's walk-through inspection on July 14, 1996 occurred 
approximately ten (-10) days after defendant Black executed the original lease agreement 
and moved into the Alpen Way residence. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 57:7-13 (April 4, 2006). 
8. At Ms. Crowley's July 14, 1996 inspection, she noted that the house was clean, 
newly carpeted, newly painted and showed no problems or damages. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
48:6-12 (April 4,2006). 
9. At Ms. Crowley's July 14, 1996 inspection, she noted that the window blinds 
throughout the house were new and in working order; all the interior doors were 
undamaged; and, all light fixtures were present and undamaged. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
48:13-21 (April 4,2006). 
10. Douglas Reynolds is a property manager for Century 21 Real Estate and has 
managed plaintiff John Crowley's property at 8828 South Alpen Way for at least five (5+) 
years. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 2:21-3:25 (April 4,2006). 
11. Property manager Reynolds and his employer (Century 21) manage 
approximately two hundred fifty (-250) rental properties. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 30:6-7 
(April 4, 2006). 
12. Reynolds managed plaintiffs Alpen Way property during the tenancy of 
defendant, Chris Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 4:1-2 (April 4, 2006). 
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13. Reynolds prepared a renewal lease agreement dated October 1, 1997 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, "P-2" ), by which defendant Chris Black continued to lease from 
plaintiff, John Crowley, the home and property located on Alpen Way. R. 154, Tr. 
Transcr. 5:5-16 (April 4, 2006). 
14. The renewed lease agreement ("P-2") in October 1997 required that the Alpen 
Way property would be left in the same condition he received it absent normal and 
ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 63:16-64:2 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 2. 
15. The October 1997 lease provides that upon termination of the lease, defendant 
Black was to surrender the premises "in as good of condition as received, normal wear 
and tear excepted." R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 6:16-18 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. 
16. The lease provides that defendant Black was to "maintain any surrounding 
grounds ... and keep the same clear of rubbish or weeds." R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 6:23-25 
(April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 
17. The lease agreement includes a space designated for the identification of 
existing problems or defects. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 7:4-8 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 2. 
18. Defendant Black did not identify any existing problems at the time the 1997 
lease agreement was signed. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 7:15-17 (April 4, 2006). 
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19. Defendant Black made no mention of any persistent water leaks or other 
damage issues in the October 1997 lease agreement renewal (Exhibit "P-2"), executed 
over one (1+) year into his tenancy at the Alpen Way property. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
96:12-17 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. 
20. Plaintiff John Crowley and his wife, Nancy Ann Crowley ("the Crowleys") 
maintain records regarding leases, tenant complaints and repairs for each rental property 
they own, including the Alpen Way property. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 48:24-49:13 (April 4, 
2006). 
21. The Crowleys have no record of any complaints or repair requests from Black 
relating to the Alpen Way property during the tenancy of defendant Black. R. 154, Tr. 
Transcr. 49:14-18 (April 4, 2006). 
22. Defendant Black's tenancy was one in which very few maintenance problems 
were reported to property manager Reynolds. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 27:2-16 (April 4, 
2006). 
23. Black's rent payments during his tenancy were consistently late. R. 154, Tr. 
Transcr. 49:23-50:2 (April 4, 2006). 
24. Defendant Black vacated the leased premises in approximately November of 
2001. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 8:2-5 (April 4, 2006). 
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25. Defendant Black failed to pay rent during and for the last month of his 
tenancy, November 2001. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 29:21-30:2 9 (April 4, 2006); R. 154, Tr. 
Transcr. 66:15-16 (April 4, 2006). 
26. Defendant Black did not leave a forwarding address with the property 
manager upon vacating the premises. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 30:3-5 (April 4, 2006). 
27. Property manager Reynolds visited the vacated property within days of 
defendant Black's move out. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 8:6-8 (April 4, 2006). 
28. When defendant Black vacated the Alpen Way property, window blinds in the 
master bedroom, the kitchen and a basement bedroom were broken. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
65:1-66:4 (April 4,2006). 
29. When defendant Black moved out, there were holes in some interior doors 
caused by moving furniture and holes in some basement walls caused by pool cues. R. 
154, Tr. Transcr. 66:5-14 (April 4, 2006). 
30. Black left behind a lot of trash and debris in the yard. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
8:12-13 (April 4, 2006). 
31. The debris left in the yard included auto wheels, tires and assorted trash. R. 
154, Tr. Transcr. 9:2-4 (April 4, 2006). 
32. During the post-move out inspection, property manager Reynolds took 
photographs (Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, "P-3") to document damages to the house. R. 154, Tr. 
Transcr. 9:20-10:5 (April 4, 2006). 
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33. Photographs of damage to sheet rock walls show holes that necessitated 
repairs such as patching and painting. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 10:22-11:8 (April 4, 2006); 
see Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
34. The damages to sheet rock walls are chargeable as tenant damages and are 
beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 11:2 and 11:8 (April 4, 2006). 
35. Photographs of interior doors show damage which necessitated the 
replacement of several doors. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 11:10-11:17 and 12:20-23 (April 4, 
2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
36. The damage to several interior doors and their replacement are chargeable as 
tenant damages and are beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 12:22-23 and 
13:3-5 (April 4, 2006). 
37. Photographs of a shower unit located in the basement show severe damage 
such as broken tiles, cracked tiles and a shower door wrenched loose from the frame. R. 
154, Tr. Transcr. 8:17-22 and 13:7-16 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
38. The damaged basement shower unit had to be completely rebuilt, including 
new tile and a new floor pan. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 13:14-17 (April 4, 2006). 
39. The cost of repair and complete rebuilding of the basement bathroom shower 
unit ($1,580.00) was a tenant responsibility and are beyond ordinary wear and tear R. 
154, Tr. Transcr. 24:5-6 and 25:9-13 (April 4, 2006). 
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40. In the opinion of property manager Reynolds, the damage to the basement 
shower unit and the cost of rebuilding it are chargeable as tenant responsibilities and are 
beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 13:20 (April 4, 2006). 
41. A photograph of a basement wall near the shower unit shows a damaged piece 
of sheet rock and a poor repair attempt which necessitated installation of a new piece of 
sheet rock. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 13:23-14:7 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
42. Photographs of a basement wall show water damage to paint and sheet rock 
caused by a basement window being left open. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 14:9-13 (April 4, 
2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
43. The water damage to the basement wall is attributable to tenant carelessness 
and is a tenant responsibility and is beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
14:14-16 (April 4, 2006). 
44. Photographs of various light fixtures throughout the residence show missing 
glass covers. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 15:6-9 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
45. The cost of replacement parts for light fixtures are a tenant responsibility and 
are beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 15:10 (April 4, 2006). 
46. Photographs of vinyl window blinds show damage and the blinds had to be 
replaced. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 15:12-17 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
47. A photograph of the interior of the oven shows that it needed cleaning and was 
not cleaned. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 15:19-16:5 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
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48. A photograph of the laundry room shows piles of debris and sawdust which 
were not cleaned up by the tenant. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 17:21-24 (April 4, 2006); 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
49. A photograph of the area below the outside deck shows debris such as auto 
wheels, tires and mattresses which had to be removed before re-leasing the residence. R. 
154, Tr. Transcr. 18:5-13 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. 
50. Defendant Black admitted leaving used automobile wheels and tires and 
various debris in the yard of the Alpen Way property and agreed that expenses incurred 
for their removal are his responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 92:20-23 (April 4, 2006). 
51. A copy of a receipt (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, "P-4") from Daryl C Payne shows 
the cost of repairs to a faulty circuit breaker and damaged wiring. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
19:9-15 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 4. 
52. The electrical repairs by Daryl C. Payne are part of regular maintenance and so 
are not a tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 19:15-16 (April 4, 2006). 
53. An invoice (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, "P-5M) from Dix Keller details the painting, 
debris-hauling, fixture replacement and various fix-ups which needed to be done after 
defendant Black moved out. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 20:5-12 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 5. 
54. The items and costs detailed in the Dix Keller invoice (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, 
"P-5") are tenant responsibilities. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 20:22-21:1 (April 4, 2006). 
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55. A document (Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, "P-6") prepared by property manager 
Reynolds identifies and reflects the costs of various repair jobs completed at the residence 
by handymen. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 21:4-9 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 6. 
56. Certain items listed in this Exhibit ("P-6") such as repairing and re-staining the 
front door; nailing patio ceiling; repairing the outside stairs and replacing the front door 
lock sets are not chargeable to the tenant. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 21:9-22:6 (April 4,2006). 
57. Other items listed in this Exhibit ("P-6") such as miscellaneous bulbs, 
electrical covers and supplies are chargeable as tenant responsibilities. R. 154, Tr. 
Transcr. 22:6-11 (April 4, 2006). 
58. A receipt from Holbrook Plumbing (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, "P-7") documents 
repairs to the upstairs master bathroom which were not chargeable as tenant 
responsibilities. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 22:20-25 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 7. 
59. A second receipt from Holbrook Plumbing (Plaintiffs Exhibit 8, "P-8") 
documents repairs to the basement bathroom in which the entire shower unit had to be 
rebuilt. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 23:6-13 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 8. 
60. The damages documented by the various photographs (Exhibit "P-3") and 
receipts (Exhibits "P-5", P-6", "P-7" and "P-8") are of the kind that should have been 
noted and described in the appropriate spaces of the lease agreement had they been 
present during the defendant-tenant's initial walkthrough. All that damage was very 
noticeable and obvious in 2001. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 25:23-26:4 (April 4, 2006). 
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61. The opinion of property manager Reynolds was that the much of the damages 
and the required repairs to the property were not the result of reasonable or ordinary wear 
and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 30:8-11 (April 4,2006). 
62. Property manager Reynolds does not recall any issue or complaints involving 
the presence of termites at the Alpen Way property. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 36:15-21 (April 
4, 2006). 
63. Any sawdust or unidentifiable dust-like matter on basement shelving or floors 
did not descend from the ceiling inasmuch as there is no ceiling in the unfinished 
basement. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 37:6-14 (April 4, 2006). 
64. A water leak in the upstairs bathroom had apparently existed for the much of 
defendant Black's tenancy but was not brought to property manager Reynolds' attention 
until shortly before Black terminated his tenancy. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 40:7-11 and 40:17-
20 (April 4, 2006). 
65. The upstairs bathroom leak was eventually repaired, the cost of which is not a 
tenant-chargeable item. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 42:12-15 (April 4, 2006). 
66. The leak in the upstairs bathroom did not cause any of the damage to the 
downstairs bathroom and shower unit, the repairs in that area are chargeable as tenant-
caused damage. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 42:18-43:10 (April 4, 2006). 
67. Defendant Black left no forwarding address with the Crowleys upon vacating 
the Alpen Way residence. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 50:3-5 (April 4, 2006). 
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68. Defendant Black does not recall ever leaving a forwarding address with the 
Crowleys or property manager Reynolds. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 67:13-21 (April 4, 2006). 
69. After he moved out, to locate defendant Black and attempt to resolve the issue 
of damages to the Alpen Way property, the Crowleys hired Paramount Detective Agency 
at a cost of $400.00. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 50:6-14 (April 4, 2006). 
70. After defendant Black vacated the Alpen Way residence, repairs to the 
damaged property required that it remain un-leased and vacant for approximately one (-1) 
month, during which no rent (at $975.00 per month) was collected. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
50:15-23 (April 4, 2006). 
71. The repairs detailed by property manager Reynolds were paid for by the 
Crowleys when they were incurred and the work done. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 51;l-2 (April 
4, 2006); R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 44:23-45:1 (April 4, 2006). 
72. Crowley retained counsel, Brian M. Barnard and James L. Harris, Jr. and paid 
legal fees to pursue the action against defendant Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 51:3-8 (April 
4, 2006). 
73. Crowley sued for reimbursement for legal fees expended in pursuing the 
action against defendant Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 51:9-11 (April 4, 2006). 
74. The front doors of the residence had consistent problems with misalignment 
which prevented them from closing or locking properly; these problems existed at the 
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time defendant Black began his tenancy and continued for the duration of his tenancy. R. 
154, Tr. Transcr. 79:15-20 (April 4, 2006). 
75. Black brought problems with the front doors to the attention of property 
manager Reynolds on several occasions during his tenancy. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 37:24-
38:5 (April 4, 2006). 
76. Defendant Black complained to property managers several times regarding the 
front doors of the residence; attempts were made by property managers to correct the 
problem. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 79:25-80:4 (April 4, 2006). 
77. Property manager Reynolds initiated several attempts to improve the 
functioning of the front doors during the tenancy of defendant Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
38:5-18 (April 4, 2006). 
78. Defendant Black purchased a refrigerator upon moving into the Alpen Way 
residence and placed it in the kitchen; defendant Black did not remove the refrigerator 
when he vacated the premises. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 88:10-16 (April 4, 2006). 
79. Defendant Black paid a security deposit upon commencing his tenancy at the 
Alpen Way property; his deposit was retained by Crowley. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 94:19-22 
(April 4, 2006). 
80. Defendant Black's complaints during his tenancy regarding the leak in the 
laundry room led to successful repairs by the Holbrook Plumbing company undertaken at 
the behest of property manager. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 95:12-21 (April 4, 2006). 
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81. The July 3,1996 lease agreement (Exhibit "P-l") formed a contract entered 
into by defendant Black and plaintiff John Crowley; the October 1997 renewal lease 
agreement continued similar contractual obligations. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 98:22-99:3 
(April 4,2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. R. 130-136. 
82. The Court found that Defendant Black breached the lease when he failed to 
pay rent for the last month of his tenancy. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:3-7 (April 4, 2006). R. 
130-136. 
83. The Court found that with regard to which damages and responsibilities are 
properly attributable to the tenant and which shall be placed on the plaintiff-owners, the 
testimony of property manager Reynolds was received as expert testimony given his 
qualifications; the Court relied upon this testimony in making its findings as to damage 
apportionment. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:25-100:5 (April 4,2006). R. 130-136. 
84. The Court found that the holes in the walls (depicted in Exhibit "P-3") are not 
the result of normal wear and tear, and cost of repairs are chargeable as tenant damages 
and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:11-16 (April 4,2006). R. 130-136. 
85. The Court found that the chipping to the walls (Exhibit "P-3") necessitated the 
painting of the entire areas affected, the cost of which is chargeable as tenant damages 
and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:17-22 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
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86. The Court found that the damage to interior doors which required their 
replacement are tenant damages and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:23-24 
(April 4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
87. The Court found that the problems with regard to the front doors (Exhibit "P-
3") were pre-existing and so are not tenant damage nor tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. 
Transcr. 100:5-9 (April4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
88. The Court found that the damage to one interior door and the missing lock-set 
there (Exhibit "P-3") are tenant damage and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
100:10-12 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
89. The Court found that due to conflicting testimony on the issue, the severely 
damaged basement shower unit (photos of damage included in Exhibit "P-3") and the cost 
of its repair and replacement (invoice included in Exhibit "P-8") should be divided 
between the tenant-defendant and plaintiff-owners, to-wit: $1,200.00 to be considered 
tenant responsibility, the balance of $380.00 to be borne by plaintiff-owner. R. 154, Tr. 
Transcr. 100:13-19 and 103:14-16 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
90. The Court found that the water damage to the basement wall caused by a 
window being left open (depicted in Exhibit "P-3") is chargeable as tenant damage and 
tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 100:20-22 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
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91. The Court found that the damage consisting of missing light fixture covers 
(Exhibit "P-3") are tenant damages and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 100:25-
101:4 (April 4,2006). R. 130-136. 
92. The Court found that the damage consisting of broken window blinds (Exhibit 
"P-3") and the cost of replacement are partially owner and partially tenant responsibility. 
R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 101:5-8 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
93. The Court found that due to the absence of any complaints or notations 
regarding damage to the premises in either the July, 1996 lease agreement (Exhibit "P-l") 
or the October, 1997 lease agreement renewal ("Exhibit P-2"), there were no complaints 
and no defects as to the condition of the premises at those times. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
101:9-14 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
94. The Court found that as to the refrigerator which defendant Black left at the 
residence, the lack of any invoice relating to the purchase precludes any credit to 
defendant vis-a-vis damages awarded to plaintiff; the refrigerator to be considered either 
a gift to plaintiffs or abandoned property. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 101:22-102:7 (April 4, 
2006). R. 130-136. 
95. The Court found that the cost of repairs to a faulty circuit breaker represented 
by the receipt from Daryl C. Payne (Exhibit "P-4") are not tenant damage and are not 
tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 102:21-23 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
21 
96. The Court found that the repairs represented by the Dix Keller invoice 
(Exhibit "P-5"), including painting, fixture replacements, various fix-ups and debris 
hauling except for the $225.00 charged for hauling away trees and shrubs, are chargeable 
to Black and are tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 102:24-103:5 (April 4, 2006). 
R. 130-136. 
97. The Court found that the repairs represented by the receipts from various 
handy-men (Exhibit "P-6") are chargeable to tenant only in the amount of $100.00 which 
includes only the cost of replacing various bulbs, electrical covers and supplies; the 
remaining repairs detailed therein are not tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 
103:6-9 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136. 
98. The Court found that the repairs relating to the upstairs master bathroom 
detailed in a Holbrook Plumbing receipt (Exhibit "P-7ff) are not chargeable to tenant and 
are not a tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 103:10-13 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-
136. 
99. The Court found that the sheet rock patching and painting of the basement, 
detailed in the Dix Keller receipt (Exhibit "P-5"), are tenant caused damages and tenant 
responsibility in the amount of $1,925.00. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 104:6-20 (April 4, 2006). 
R. 130-136. 
100. The Court found that the total damages in repairs to the Alpen Way premises 
which are chargeable to defendant-tenant Black and which are to be awarded to plaintiff-
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owner Crowley are $4,679.26. That amount does not include and plaintiff is not awarded 
pre-judgment interest. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 104:21-106:18 (April 4, 2006) and Order and 
Judgment T[ 2 (June 9, 2006). R. 130-136. 
101. The total damages (rent, repairs, expenses, etc.) requested by plaintiff 
Crowley, in terms of repairs to the Alpen Way property, were $5,538.00. R. 154, Tr. 
Transcr. 105:8-12 (April 4,2006). 
102. The Court orally stated that inasmuch as the damages actually awarded to 
plaintiff Crowley ($4,679.26) fall short of the damages requested ($5,538.00), there is no 
prevailing party under the circumstances of this case. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 106:19-23 
(April 4, 2006). 
103. The Court recognizes that the underlying contracts/lease agreements 
(Exhibits "P-1" and "P-2") contain provision for attorneys fees and that attorneys fees are 
requested by plaintiff. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 103:23-25 and 51:9-11 (April 4, 2006). Those 
contracts specifically state: 
In the event that the Owner shall prevail in any legal action brought by either party 
to enforce the terms hereof or relating to the demised premises, Owner shall be 
entitled to all costs incurred in connection with such action, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2 (Lease Agreements dated July 3, 1996 and Oct. 10, 1997). R. 
130-13646. 
104. The Court denied any award of attorneys fees. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 106:22-
24 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136, f 27. 
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105. The Court found that plaintiff is not entitled to pre-judgment interest on the 
awarded money damages of $4,679.26. Order and Judgment f 1 (June 9, 2006). R. 137-
138. 
106. The Court awarded to plaintiff damages in the amount of $4,679.26 with 
post-judgment interest from April 4, 2006 as per Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1953 as 
amended) at a rate of 6.37% per annum until paid. Order and Judgment f 3 (June 9, 
2006). R. 137-138. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
John Crowley sued Chris Black seeking damages for breach of a written rental 
agreement. Crowley sought $5,538.00 in the Complaint. After a bench trial, the Hon. 
Glenn Iwasaki, judge awarded Crowley $4,679.26 in damages. 
The written rental agreement provided that Crowley as landlord and the prevailing 
party in a lawsuit against the former tenant Black would be awarded attorney fees. The 
trial court orally ruled there was no prevailing party. The trial court refused to award 
attorney fees to Crowley. The trial court made insufficient findings to justify the denial 
of an award of attorney fees. 
Crowley was the successful party to the litigation; he was awarded the bulk of 
damages that he had sought in his complaint. Crowley was the prevailing party and the 
trial court erred in not awarding attorney fees to Crowley. 
24 
The damages suffered by Crowley as a result of Black's mis-conduct were specific 
and easily calculated with certainty when they were incurred. For instance, Crowley 
presented receipts showing he paid for the necessary repairs within months of Black's 
vacating the premises. Crowley sought and was entitled to prejudgment interest. 
The trial court refused to award prejudgment interest to Crowley. The trial court made 
insufficient findings to justify the denial of prejudgment interest. 
Because damages were incurred in a certain amount and on a certain date, plaintiff 
was entitled to and should have been awarded prejudgment interest. The trial court erred 
in not awarding prejudgment interest. 
Crowley has incurred attorney fees and court costs in the pursuit of this appeal. He 
seeks and is entitled to an award of those fees and court costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS 
LEGAL ERROR BECAUSE LOSSES INCURRED ARE PRECISE SUMS 
FIXED AT A DEFINITE TIME. 
A trial court's decision regarding entitlement to prejudgment interest is a question 
of law, which this Court reviews for correctness and to which it will accord no deference. 
Lefavi v. Bertoch. 2000 UT App. 5,123, 994 P.2d 817. Under Utah law, prejudgment 
interest may be awarded to provide full compensation for actual loss. See Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989). The award is proper if the loss 
is fixed at a definite time and the interest can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. 
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Coalville City v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). This Court has 
explained that an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate in cases where plaintiff has 
suffered damages due to the "defendant's delay in tendering an amount clearly owing 
under an agreement or other obligation," Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debrv, 38 P.3d 
984, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), and where plaintiff should be fairly compensated for "the 
depreciating value of the amount owed over time." Lefavi v. Bertoch, supra at ^ 24. 
Here, the court erred in its denial of plaintiff s request for prejudgment interest 
because plaintiffs loss "is fixed at a definite time and the interest can be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy." See Coalville City, supra. 
First, in proceedings below, the court found that the lease agreements between 
defendant Black and plaintiff Crowley formed a contract and defendant was bound to 
fulfill the contractual obligations. Statement of Facts | 81, supra. The court found that 
under the terms of the contract, defendant was obligated to leave plaintiffs property in 
the same condition he received it, except for normal and ordinary wear and tear. 
Statement of Facts \ 14,115, supra. The court also found that when defendant failed to 
pay rent during November 2001, defendant breached the contract. Statement of Facts f 
82, supra. Furthermore, the court found that upon vacating in November 2001, defendant 
Black surrendered the premises in damaged condition beyond normal wear and tear— 
constituting another breach of the contract. See Statement of Facts fflf 82-101, supra. 
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These breaches of the contract, and the damages resulting therefrom, can be fixed at a 
definite time. Statement of Facts % 71; 82 et seq., supra. 
Finally, the amount of damages incurred by Crowley due to the breach committed 
by Black are in certain sums and because they originated at a definite time, interest "can 
be calculated with mathematical accuracy." City of Coalville, supra. Sitting below as 
fact finder, the trial court determined that upon moving out in November 2001, Black 
caused damage, beyond normal wear and tear, in the amount of $ 4,679.26. Statement of 
Facts Tf 100, supra. The court determined this amount after trial where plaintiff Crowley 
presented the court with receipts, invoices and testimony indicating that plaintiff had 
expended money repairing the residence damaged by Black. See Statement of Facts f 
100, supra. 
Crowley is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law. Plaintiffs loss is 
definite and fixed as to both amount ($4,679.26) and time (November 2001). See 
Statement of Facts f 100, f 71, supra. These two facts allow for the calculation of 
prejudgment interest "with mathematical accuracy." See City of Coalville, supra. As 
such, the court below committed legal error in denying plaintiffs request for prejudgment 
interest. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED ATTORNEY FEES TO 
PLAINTIFF DESPITE DEFENDANT'S CONTRACTUAL BREACH. 
A. The trial court abused its discretion by finding that plaintiff was not the 
prevailing party and by denying plaintiffs request for attorney fees. 
"In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or contract." 
R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 40 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Utah 2002); quoting Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 
(1996)(attorney fees may be awarded to a prevailing party based on a written contract). 
Sitting as fact finder, the trial court found that the underlying contracts/lease agreements 
contain provisions for attorney fees. See Statement of Facts ]f 105, supra} However, the 
trial court denied plaintiffs request for attorney's fees determining that plaintiff was not 
the prevailing party and, further, that there was no prevailing party under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. Statement of Facts f 106, supra. The trial court's 
determination that plaintiff was not the prevailing party constitutes an abuse of discretion 
and its denial of plaintiff s requested attorney's fees was erroneous. 
1. Prevailing party determination. 
Whether a party is the prevailing party is a question for the trial court, and depends 
in large measure on the context of each case. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 
1
 These contracts specifically state: "In the event that the Owner shall prevail in 
any legal action brought by either party to enforce the terms hereof or relating to the 
demised premises, Owner shall be entitled to all costs incurred in connection with such 
action, including a reasonable attorney's fee." See Statement of Facts ^ 105, supra; 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2 (Lease Agreements dated July 3, 1996 and October 10, 1997). 
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1119, 1126-27 (Utah 2002). Therefore, "it is appropriate to leave this determination to 
the sound discretion of the trial court." id. Considerations for the trial court include, but 
are not limited to, 
(1) contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, 
etc., brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other 
and their significance in the context of the lawsuit as a whole, and (4) the dollar 
amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims. Id. 
These criteria allow for a flexible, case-by-case evaluation capable of yielding outcomes 
where "both, or neither, parties may be considered to have prevailed." Id. However, in 
this case, the trial court's analysis failed to adequately address the R.T. Nielson Co. 
factors and failed to make the necessary findings; its determination that neither party 
prevailed falls outside the controlling law. 
In relatively simple cases such as this, where there are only two parties, and no 
counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., "determining the 'prevailing party' for purposes of 
awarding fees [can be] quite simple." Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 
P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Where plaintiff sues for money damages, and 
plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing party; if defendant successfully defends and 
avoids any adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed. Id. Regardless of whether the 
trial court applies the straight-forward, simple Mountain States Broadcasting Co. analysis 
or it resorts to the more in-depth R.T. Nielson Co. criteria, the result should be the same: 
plaintiff Crowley successfully litigated his breach of contract claim and was awarded the 
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bulk of the money damages prayed for. Thus, plaintiff Crowley was the prevailing party 
below. 
First, the trial court expressly found that defendant Black breached the lease 
agreement by failing to pay his last month's rent (Statement of Facts f84, supra) and by 
damaging the leased premises beyond normal wear and tear in the amount of $4,679.26. 
Statement of Facts 1102, supra. Plaintiff Crowley's sole claim, based on defendant 
Black's breach of the lease, was thus successfully litigated and yielded money damages. 
Defendant Black failed to avoid an adverse judgment and brought no counterclaim. As 
such, the simplified prevailing party analysis in Mountain States Broadcasting Co.. supra, 
is appropriate. It premises prevailing party status on the simple determination of whether 
plaintiff sued for and is awarded money damages.2 Proper analysis in the case at bar 
would similarly dictate an award of a reasonable attorney fee to plaintiff Crowley. The 
trial court's failure to apply this simple analysis, in spite of its findings that defendant 
breached the underlying contract and that plaintiff was entitled to damages, is an abuse of 
discretion. 
2
 In contrast to the simple nature of the case at bar, R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 
which announced the more complex analysis and four criteria, involved a complicated 
array of claims {e.g., breach of contract, account stated, breach of fiduciary duty, etc.), 
counterclaims {e.g., breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, etc.) 
and substantial money damages which necessitated the in-depth analysis prescribed. 40 
P.3d 1119, 1127 (Utah 2002). 
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Second, even though the trial court's decision3 to apply the more in-depth and 
complicated analysis prescribed by R.T. Nielson Co., supra, falls within its discretion, the 
trial court failed to properly apply this analysis and based its determination on an 
inadequate review of the R.T. Nielson Co. factors. The R.T. Nielson Co. analysis should 
include a detailed review of each of the four criteria. See Carlson Distributing Co. v. Salt 
Lake Brewing Co.. 95 P.3d 1171,1181 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)(stating with approval that 
"The trial court addressed the R.T.Nielson Co. factors in detail and determined that 
neither party was the prevailing party.")- The court below summarily denied plaintiff 
Crowley's request for attorney's fees based solely on its determination that inasmuch as 
the damages actually awarded to plaintiff ($4,679.26) fell short of the damages requested 
($5,538.00), there was no prevailing party. Statement of Facts f 104, supra. This 
observation by the trial court comprises the entirety of its prevailing party analysis. There 
were no findings of fact to support the determination. As such, there is insufficient basis 
under the R.T. Nielson Co. framework to support the court's denial of attorney's fees. 
Under R.T. Nielson Co.. a prevailing party determination must include analysis 
including: 1) contractual language; 2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, 
etc.; 3) the importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in the 
context of the lawsuit as a whole; and, 4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in 
connection with the various claims. 40 P.3d at 1127 (Utah 2002). Here, the trial court 
3
 The trial court failed to indicate any legal authority upon which it relied. 
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failed to mention, much less analyze, the first, second or third R.T. Nielson factors. 
These failures alone render the trial court's analysis inadequate to support its prevailing 
party determination, and make its denial of attorney's fees an abuse of discretion. 
Properly applied, the second factor- review of the number of claims, 
counterclaims, cross-claims, etc.- would lead to a finding that plaintiff Crowley brought 
one claim for breach of contract which resulted in damages itemized and presented to the 
court. Defendant Black brought no counterclaim. The trial court's finding that defendant 
Black breached the underlying contracts (Statement of Facts f 82 et seq., f 100, supra) 
means under the second factor plaintiff prevailed: plaintiff brought a breach of contract 
claim and the court found that defendant breached the contract. 
As to the third factor-review of the importance of the claims relative to each other 
and in the context of the lawsuit as a whole— proper application yields the conclusion: 
plaintiffs breach of contract claim was the only claim and was the whole lawsuit. 
Inasmuch as the trial court found that defendant breached the contract (Statement of Facts 
U 84,1f 102, supra), plaintiff must be the prevailing party under the third factor. 
The fourth R.T. Nielson Co. factor-comparison of the dollar amounts attached to 
and awarded in connection with the various claims- is the only factor touched upon by 
the trial court. However, the court's bald and singular observation that the damage 
amount awarded fell short of the specific amount requested (Statement of Facts % 104, 
supra) is not a proper application of this factor. This Nielson factor says nothing about 
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comparing damage amounts requested with damage amounts awarded with respect to a 
single claim. Rather, the fourth R.T. Nielson Co. factor simply directs a review of "the 
dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims." 40 P.3d 
at 1127. The trial court could not compare various claims because there were none other 
than plaintiffs one claim. Instead, the trial court erroneously compared the damages 
awarded with those requested, concluding that plaintiff Crowley did not prevail because 
he was not awarded all damages associated with his cause of action.4 
Properly applied, this last factor would yield the conclusion that on the only claim 
asserted by plaintiff (breach of contract), defendant was liable (he breached the contract) 
and the damages awarded were $4,679.26. See Statement of Facts f 102, supra. 
Defendant Black did not bring any counter-claim and failed to defeat the claim brought 
by plaintiff. The fact that the sole claim, successfully asserted, did not yield all of the 
money damages requested by plaintiff does not render the claim unsuccessful under the 
fourth R.T. Nielson Co. factor. This factor weighs in favor of a finding that plaintiff 
Crowley was the prevailing party. 
Because the trial court failed to carry out the proper prevailing party analysis, its 
ultimate conclusion that neither party prevailed represents an abuse of discretion. The 
failure of the trial court to make any findings make appellate review difficult, if not 
4
 Had plaintiffs complaint simply prayed for damages as "to be determined at 
trial" (rather than a specific amount), perhaps the trial court's analysis may have been 
different. 
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impossible. See Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah \9&5)(stating "an award [or 
denial] of attorneys fees must generally be made on the basis of findings of fact supported 
by evidence and appropriate conclusions of law."). Given the trial court's improper 
prevailing party analysis and failure to make findings, the resulting denial of plaintiff 
Crowley's requested attorney's fees constitutes clear legal error and should be reversed by 
this Court. 
Plaintiff requests an award of his attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this appeal. 
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assoc, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) 
(holding that a contract provision for attorney fees includes those incurred by the 
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial). The terms of the underlying contract 
(Statement of Facts f 105, supra; Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2 (Lease Agreements dated 
July 3, 1996 and October 10, 1997)) mean that if plaintiff Crowley prevails on appeal, he 
should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees including those incurred in pursuing such 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF 
A. ATTORNEY FEE CLAIM 
The trial court denied plaintiffs request for an award of attorney fees. The trial 
court provided little explanation in its oral ruling as to the factual or legal reason for the 
denial of an award of attorney fees. The trial court prepared inadequate findings 
regarding attorney fees. 
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Plaintiffs attorney fees request was based upon the written lease between the 
parties. 
Plaintiff was the prevailing party because a judgment for past due rent, lost rent 
and for damages to the rental property was awarded to plaintiff at trial. 
Plaintiff incurred attorney fees in excess of seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00) in 
pursuit of this action. Based upon the written lease, plaintiff is entitled to and should 
have been awarded attorney fees and out of pocket expenses incurred in the successful 
pursuit of this action. 
B. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST CLAIM 
In this landlord and tenant dispute, Plaintiff was awarded special damages for 
unpaid rent, for lost rent, and for damage caused to plaintiffs rental property during 
defendant's occupancy. All those damages are in amounts certain. All damages were 
established by evidence or receipts showing payment made by plaintiff in 2001 and 2002. 
In light of the nature of the damages awarded in specific amounts, plaintiff is entitled to 
prejudgment interest. 
With clear and specific factual information, plaintiffs special damages as 
presented at trial and as found by the Court were measured by "facts and figures" or 
"calculated with mathematical accuracy." Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is 
entitled, as a matter of law, to prejudgment interest. 
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This Court should rule that plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and prejudgment 
interest. 
Plaintiff should be granted his costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
DATED this 16th day of JANUARY 2007. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
XT7 
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ATTACHMENT "A" 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Randall Gaither 
Attorney for Defendant 
159 West 300 South 
The Broadway Lofts, # 105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JOHN K. CROWLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRIS BLACK, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT & 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: Civil No. 02-090-4266 CN 
: (Hon. Glenn Iwasaki) 
The above captioned matter having come before this Court for 
trial on April 4, 2006, the Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. The 
plaintiff, John K. Crowley being present in person and being 
represented by counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD and JAMES L. HARRIS, JR. 
The defendant, CHRIS BLACK, being present and being represented 
by counsel RANDALL T. GAITHER. The parties having presented 
testimony and evidence anc the matter having been argued and 
suomitted, the Court having reached and announced its decision. 
The Court en June 9, 2006 having aer.iea plaintiff's request for a 
new trial and having sustained defendant's objection to an award 
of pre-judgment interest. Based thereon and for good cause 
appearing, the Court hereby makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This action involves a written residential lease entered 
into and to be performed in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. The defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. Plaintiff owns a home and real property located at 8828 
South Alpen Way, Sandy, Utah. 
4. Plaintiff John K. Crowley and defendant, Chris Black 
entered into a written lease agreement on or about October 1, 
1997, by which Black leased from plaintiff the home and property 
located on Alpen Way. 
5. The lease provides that upon the termination of the 
lease, defendant Black was to leave the home "in good condition 
as received, normal wear and tear excepted.7' 
6. The lease provides that in the event suit is commenced 
and plaintiff is successful to enforce any "cerm of the lease, the 
defendant shall be responsible for plaintiff's reasonable costs 
including attorney fees and court costs. 
7. Defendant terminated the lease and vacated the premises 
m December 2001. 
8. Defendant did not pay the last month's rent (December 
2001) owed to plaintiff in the sum of $975.00. 
9. Defendants security deposit of $925.00 should be 
credited against the judgment entered against defendant. 
10. The refusal to pay last month's rent was a breach of 
the lease. 
11. Upon termination of the lease, defendant failed to 
leave the home in as good condition as received, normal wear and 
tear excepted. That was a breach of the lease. 
12. During the term of the lease, extensive damage occurred 
to the home and premises, beyond ordinary wear and tear. That 
was a breach of the lease. 
13. The damage to the home included holes made in doors and 
sheet rock, missing light fixtures and door knobs, damaged 
blinds, damage to the bathrooms, etc. 
14. Plaintiff incurred costs in repairing the damage to the 
home which occurred during defendant's occupancy. 
15. Plaintiff incurred costs in removing debris left by 
defendant after his occupancy. 
16. Plaintiff has incurred expenses in repairs io the home 
as a result of damages caused during defendant's tenancy. 
17. Plaintiff incurred expense of SI,580.00 to rebuild the 
shower and surrounding area of a bathroom due to damage by the 
defendant. The defendant is responsible for and should pay 
$1,200.00, a portion of that expense. 
18. Plaintiff incurred expense of $1,925.00 to prepare and 
paint the basement interior due to damage from the defendant. 
The defendant is responsible for and shall pay said $1,925.00 of 
that expense. 
19. Plaintiff incurred expense of $476.50 to replace and 
stain five damaged interior doors damaged beyond repair during 
the defendant's tenancy. The defendant is responsible and should 
pay said $476.50 for that damage. 
20. Plaintiff incurred expense of $100.00 to repair and 
replace a sliding door. Plaintiff incurred expense of $200.00 to 
clean the premises after defendant vacated the tenancy. 
Plaintiff incurred expense of $50.00 to replace two (2) broken 
window blinds. The defendant is responsible for that damage and 
should pay $350.00 for those costs. 
21. Plaintiff incurred expense of $75.00 to replace missing 
light fixture covers and light bulbs. The defendant is 
responsible for that damage and should pay $75.00. 
22. Plaintiff incurred expense of $225.00 to haul debris 
from the property left by defendant along with other yard waste 
from trees, etc. The plaintiff shall be responsible and bear 
this expense. 
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23. Plaintiff incurred expense of $150.26 to repair and 
stain the front door of the home. The plaintiff shall be 
responsible and bear this expense. 
24. The plaintiff incurred expense of $100.00 for 
miscellaneous repairs, missing electric outlet covers and 
supplies and $15.26 to take pictures of the damage done to the 
property. The defendant is responsible for and should pay 
$115.26 for said expenses. 
25. Plaintiff incurred expense of $307.00 for plumbing 
repairs to the bathrooms and kitchen. The plaintiff shall be 
responsible and bear this expense. 
26. Plaintiff lost rent during the time necessary to effect 
repairs to the property. Defendant should pay half of one 
month's lost rent in the sum of $487.50. 
27. Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees. 
28. Plaintiff incurred expense of fees of $400.00 to hire a 
private detective to locate defendant after he moved out and 
failed to provided his new street address. Plaintiff shall be 
responsible for this expense. 
29. Any conclusion of law more appropriately a finding of 
fact should be so considered and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
c 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
Chris Black. 
2. The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
this action. 
3. Defendant breached the lease agreement between the 
parties. 
4. The damage to the property, by defendant and/or during 
his tenancy, is beyond reasonable wear and tear. 
5. Defendant failed to pay last month's rent in violation 
of the lease agreement. Plaintiff is entitled to collect the 
last month's rent in the amount of $975.00. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to damages for repairs to the 
property in the amount of $4,141.76. 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to a portion of lost rent during 
the time necessary to effect repairs to the property in the 
amount of $487.50. 
8. Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees. 
Plaintiff should be awarded his courc costs pursuant to Rule 
54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
9. The defendant should be given a S925.00 credit for his 
secun~v zevos~-Z. 
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10. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment after credit for 
the security deposit for the total money damages of $4,679.26. 
10. Plaintiff should not be awarded pre-judgment interest. 
11. Plaintiff should be awarded courts costs in the sum of 
$327.80. 
12. The judgment shall bear post judgment interest from 
April 4, 2006 as per Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1953 as Amended) at 
a rate of 6.37% per annum. 
13. Any finding of fact more appropriately a conclusion of 
law should be so considered and incorporated herein by reference. 
DATED this day of JUNE, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ * / 
GLENN K.' IWASAKI ' 
Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ATTACHMENT "B" 
Final Judgment and Order 
Randall Gaither 
Attorney for Defendant 
159 West 300 South 
The Broadway Lofts, # 105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JOHN K. CROWLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRIS BLACK, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. 02-090-4266 CN 
: (Hon. Glenn Iwasaki) 
The above captioned matter having come before this Court for 
trial on April 4, 2006, the Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. The 
plaintiff, John W. Crowley being present in person and being 
represented by counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD and JAMES L. HARRIS, JR. 
The defendant, CHRIS BLACK, being present and being represented 
by counsel RANDALL T. GAITHER. The parties having presented 
testimony and evidence and the matter having been argued and 
submitted, the Court having reached and announced its decision. 
The Court en June 9, 2006 having denied plaintiff's motion for 
new trial and having sustained defendant's objection to pre-
judgment interest. The Court having previously made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, based thereon and 
for good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant in the 
amount of four thousand six hundred seventy-nine dollars and 
twenty-six cents ($4,679.26), which does not include pre-judgment 
interest. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded courts costs in the sum of $327.80. 
3. The judgment shall bear post judgment interest from 
April 4, 2006 as per Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1953 as amended) at 
a rate of 6.37% per annum until paid. 
DATED this day of JUNE, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
GLENN K./CWASAKI 
Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ER-TAN M. 3ARNA££-"--"' 
Attorney for /Plaintiff 
